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Safepay

Ransomware Active
Origin
Unknown
Motivation
Financial
First seen
Nov 20, 2024
Last activity
2 days ago
Techniques
150
Victims posted
627

About

SafePay ransomware started in October 2024 as a new ransomware service, using some of the leaked LockBit source code. Soon after launching, the group made a big impact in the ransomware world, hacking at least 33 organizations by December 9. The first version of SafePay was created by modifying the LockBit source code. It adds the ".safepay" extension to files that it encrypts and includes a ransom note called "readme_safepay.txt." This version uses a three-step XOR method with a random single-byte key, making it hard for security researchers to analyse. The group's technical infrastructure includes both a dark web blog and a presence on the TON network for victim communications. Their attack methodology follows a double extortion model, combining traditional file encryption with data theft to maximise pressure on victims. SafePay operators typically move from initial access to ransomware deployment in under 24 hours, significantly faster than the industry average.. Among the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of the SafePay group, notable characteristics include the use of compromised VPN credentials as an initial access vector, extensive use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins), and sophisticated privilege escalation techniques. The group frequently employs ShareFinder.ps1 for network reconnaissance and uses WinRAR for data archival before exfiltration. Post encryption, SafePay directs victims to their negotiation portal accessible through both Tor and TON networks. The group has demonstrated sophisticated operational security measures, including a Cyrillic-language-based killswitch that prevents execution in eastern European countries.

Victims per month (12 months)

68
12
11
01
3
02
8
03
10
04
30
05
21
06
33
07
12
08
32
09
22
10
19
11

Leak site as captured

17 Nov 2026 15:09 UTC
Leak site homepage as captured

Leak sites & mirrors

1 online 15 offline
a5d3ot…4yovi2id.onion file server
4feb45…t3bxo4ad.onion file server
crmbcd…dgcc6xid.onion file server
dgcg5n…f6yhw3ad.onion chat
duslj3…f6u2xrad.onion file server
dwizzp…rqx3lwid.onion file server
fcde4o…wbiz6oyd.onion file server
iieavv…tfphw6ad.onion file server
j3dp6o…dfbphhid.onion leak site
nj5qix…bivcs6qd.onion leak site
nz4z6r…7gstpjid.onion leak site
oxly5v…7e4qr2ad.onion chat
qkzxze…7cql4gyd.onion file server
sa…y.ton leak site
safepa…dgubmoyd.onion leak site
wmgres…izfugryd.onion file server

Addresses collected and maintained by Amit Cohen Scali, CTI Research Lead at Citadel

Tools & malware

7-Zip CMSTPLUA dllhost.exe Invoke-ShareFinder Regsvr32.exe WinRAR

Malware · tools (often legitimate software abused)

Contacts & addresses

How the group asks to be reached and where it publishes, as open sources list them. Full addresses: approved researchers only.

Email · 1
Va…4@protonmail.com RansomLook
Sites · 1
cqkrkm…seij5gad.onion Leak site · Ransomware.live

Attribution reflects public research and can change. Technique data: MITRE ATT&CK® (see notices).